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NOTE
Federal Regulation of Embryonic Stem Cells:
Can Government Do It? An Examination of
Potential Regulation through the Eyes of
California's Recent Legislation
by FRANCESCA CRISERA*

I. INTRODUCTION
In 1998, scientists at Johns Hopkins University and the
University of Wisconsin independently discovered methods for
extracting human embryonic stem cells from fetuses.1 With 'this
discovery, some members of the scientific community recognized a
unique opportunity to advance the goal of finding treatments and
cures for diseases and disorders such as Parkinson's, Alzheimer's, and
cancer. Previously, this hope had seen little success. Scientists who
are proponents of embryonic stem cell research acknowledge that the
exceptional potential of these cells to divide, reproduce, and thrive in
environments foreign to those from which they originate presents a
promising source for therapeutic treatments.
Opponents of
embryonic stem cell research, both within and outside of the scientific
community, believe that research on embryos is immoral and/or
unnecessary because stem cells can be acquired from other sources in
the human body.2
. J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2004. I would like
to
acknowledge with appreciation the support, encouragement, and critical commentary of
Professor David Faigman in the development of this note.
1. Press Release, Johns Hopkins Med. Inst., Hopkins Research Team Cultures
Long-Awaited
Human
Embryonic
Stem
Cells
(Nov.
5,
1998),
http://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/press/1998/981105; Terry Devitt, Wisconsin Scientists
Culture
Elusive
Embryonic
Stem
Cells
(Nov.
5,
1998),
at
http://www.news.wisc.edu//story.php?id=3327.
2. Symposium, Cloning Californians? Report of the California Advisory Committee
[355]
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The debate surrounding stem cell research, particularly
embryonic stem cell research, is one involving much acrimony, both
at the research and practical stages. A comparison between an edict
issued by the President and a law passed in California illustrates this
debate. In 2001, President Bush declared that federal funding of stem
cell research would be permitted, but severely limited. Specifically,
he announced that federal funding of embryonic stem cell research
would cease, but research conducted using non-embryonic stem cells
still would be supported by federal funds. President Bush qualified
this ban by permitting continued federal funding of embryonic stem
cell research on an estimated sixty-four existing cell lines. The
President did not, however, ban embryonic stem cell research
altogether; he merely placed a prohibition on the use of public funds
for such research (with the exception of the above-mentioned cell
lines).' So, as it stands, private funding of embryonic stem cell
research still is permitted with restrictions.
Recognizing the enormous potential for critical medical
breakthroughs via embryonic stem cell research, on September 22,
2002, California passed Senate Bill 253 authorizing research involving
the derivation and use of human embryonic stem cells
The
following day, California extended its standing ban on human
reproductive cloning, but continued to allow human therapeutic (i.e.,
non-reproductive) cloning.' The legislative action taken by California
on September 23, 2002 demonstrates the state's commitment to
regulate, but not prohibit experimentation in areas, such as stem cell
research, that fall within the category of human non-reproductive
cloning.
So far, there has been a generally positive response to
California's law among proponents of the research and members of
the scientific community. For example, incident to an anonymous $12
million private donation, Stanford University announced that it
on Human Cloning, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1143,1193 (2002).
3. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, White House Fact
Sheet:
Embryonic
Stem
Cell
Research
(Aug.
9,
2001),
available at
http://www.npaf.org/initiatives.php?p=85.
4. Id.
5. S.B. 253, 2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002); see former CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE §§ 12115-17 (West 2002), respectively renumbered and amended by CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE §§ 125300, 125315, 125320 (West Supp. 2004).
6. S.B. 1230, 2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002); see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§§ 24185-86 (West Supp. 2004); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 16004, 16105 (West Supp.
2003).
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would create an institute dedicated to cancer research and stem cell
biology.'
And, recently, a preeminent stem cell scientist from
Harvard moved to San Diego to head an independent research center
that will focus on stem cell experimentation.8
The California law stands in direct conflict with President Bush's
edict limiting embryonic stem cell research. Because no federal
legislation supercedes California's law, California's practice presently
appears constitutional. It seems probable that given the amount of
public opposition to stem cell research in general, and embryonic
stem cell research in particular, Congress will take some action to
clarify and codify the national position on this topic. One wonders,
then, what the fate of California's law will be. An obvious inquiry
involves whether the federal government has the power to regulate
stem cells and/or the products thereof at all. In theory, Congress
could attempt to justify the regulation of stem cells and related
products pursuant to a number of constitutionally based powers.
However, analysis of such possible sources of power reveals that none
of them would prove sufficient to authorize federal regulation of stem
cells.
I will begin by providing a synopsis of stem cell biology and the
moral and ethical controversy enshrouding it. Once this groundwork
is laid, I will describe the California law in greater detail and offer an
historical overview of the position of the federal government in the
area of stem cell research. Finally, I will undertake to demonstrate
that Congress does not have the constitutional authority to regulate
stem cells or the products of stem cell research under any of its
enumerated powers.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF STEM CELL BIOLOGY
A. What is a stem cell and where is one found?
Stem cells are undifferentiated cells capable of indefinitely
producing other like cells or dividing to produce function-specific
cells within the body.9 There are three types of stem cells: totipotent,
pluripotent, and multipotent. Totipotent stem cells are created at the
7. News Release, Stanford Univ. Med. Ctr., Stanford Launches Unique Cancer and
Stem Cell Biology Institute (Dec. 10, 2002), http://mednews.stanford.edu/stem-cellinstitute.html.
8. Carl T. Hall, Harvard Researcher Mines Stem Cell Riches in West, S.F. CHRON.,
Jan. 6, 2003, at A6.
9. Anne E. Bishop et al., Embryonic Stem Cells, 197 J. PATHOLOGY 424, 424 (2002).
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time of fertilization and are present only during the first four days
following conception, after which they become pluripotent cells.1 °
Totipotent stem cells have the unique capacity to develop into any
cell type in the body and therefore can give rise to an adult
organism." In contrast, pluripotent stem cells can differentiate into
many, but not all cell types and cannot create a new human being.12
Generally speaking, it is the pluripotent stem cells that are used for
medical experimentation." Multipotent stem cells are adult cells that
typically are capable of producing only other cells of the same type."
Stem cells can be harvested from a variety of human tissues
including bone marrow, brain, muscle, umbilical cord blood, liver, and
fetal and embryonic tissues. 5 Embryonic stem cells are harvested
from the inner cell mass of the embryonic blastocyst, an early cluster
of cells that have undergone several divisions. Removing these stem
cells from the blastocyst results in the death of the embryo from
which they are derived. Pluripotent stem cells further specialize into
multipotent stem cells, which are harvested directly from the tissues
in which they are found. In contrast to embryonic stem cells which
possess a unique plasticity, adult stem cells are more committed; that
is, they usually only can develop into the cell species of the organ
from which they originate. 7 For instance, an adult stem cell derived
from the liver generally gives rise only to other liver cells, whereas an
embryonic stem cell from the liver can give rise to neurons, blood
cells, or other cell types.
B. What is the function of a stem cell and why is it useful?
Stem cells have two primary functions: (1) self-renewal and (2)

10. Alo H. Konsen, Are We Killing the Weak to Heal the Sick?. Federally Funded
Embryonic Stem Cell Research, 12 HEALTH MATRIX 507, 508 (2002).
11. David B. Resnik, The Commercializationof Human Stem Cells: Ethicaland Policy
Issues, 10 HEALTH CARE ANALYSIS 127, 128 (2002); Konsen, supra note 10, at 508.
12. Resnik, supra note 11, at 128.
13. Rhonda
Lahiri
&
Mie
Kingsley,
Stem
Cell
Basics,
http://www.molbio.princeton.edu/courses/mb427/2001/projects/09/SObasics.htm
(last
visited Jan. 20, 2003).
14. Carly Goldstein, Note, Dipping Into Uncle Sam's Pocket's: Federal Funding of
Stem Cell Research: Is It Legal?, 11 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 229, 234 (2002).
15. E.D. Pellegrino, Balancing Science, Ethics and Politics: Stem Cell Research, A
ParadigmCase, 18 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 591, 593 (2002).
16. Bishop, supra note 9, at 425.
17. Goldstein, supra note 14, at 234.
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division and differentiation.'8 The importance of these functions
cannot be underestimated. To survive, the human body needs stem
cell populations to renew themselves on a continual basis. Similarly,
to give rise to the specialized cells of each organ, stem cells divide and
differentiate, thereby creating and sustaining the various tissues and
organs of the body.
Because stem cells are capable of regeneration, scientists and the
medical community see a distinct potential in these cells for use in
experimentation and medical treatment. On a most basic level, stem
cell research can lead to an increased understanding of the processes
of cellular differentiation and human development. 9 From the more
advanced standpoint of medical science there is an even greater
therapeutic benefit that could be harnessed from experimentation
with stem cells. Currently, replacement of damaged tissues or organs
is limited by factors such as immune rejection, short supply, and
donor site morbidity. 20 The envisioned therapeutic benefits of stem
cell research are impressive and include, among others, curing
diseases and providing a low-rejection alternative to present organ
transplant procedures.2' Specifically, scientists expect that stem cell
research will one day lead to cures for diseases such as Alzheimer's,
Parkinson's, diabetes, forms of heart disease, and cancer.22 Advances
in stem cell biology could lead to more frequent and successful organ
transplant operations because embryonic stem cells placed in a new
environment in the body believe that they are in their native
environment; consequently, after transplant they have the potential to
avoid rejection of the donor organ.2 ' Today, the focus of such
therapeutic potential rests on the use of embryonic stem cells;
18. Interview by Salick Health Care Patient Resource Center with John Kemshead,
Ph.D., Director, Clinical and Scientific Affairs, Nexell Therapeutics, Stem Cell
Transplantation:

A

New

Option

for

Treating

Cancer,

http://www.salick.com/resource/features/stem.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2003).
19. Ass'n
of
Am.
Med.
Coll.,
Stem
Cell
Research,
http://www.aamc.org/advocacy/library/research/res0002.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2003).
20. A. Vats et al., Stem Cells: Sources and Applications, 27 CLINICAL
OTOLARYNGOLOGY 227, 227 (2002).
21. See Cloning Californians?,supra note 2, at 1157-58; Erin P. George, The Stem Cell
Debate: The Legal, Political and Ethical Issues Surrounding Federal Funding of Scientific

Research on Human Embryos, 12 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 747, 758 (2002) (citing Gabriel
S. Gross, Comment, Federally Funding Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research: An
Administrative Analysis, 2000 Wis. L. REV. 855, 856 (2000)); Goldstein, supra note 14, at

235.
22. Cloning Californians?supra note 2, at 1157-58; George, supra note 21, at 757.
23. Goldstein, supra note 14, at 235; Vats, supra note 20, at 227.
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however, there are suggestions that adult stem cells also possess
therapeutic potential.24 California seeks to advance this sort of
therapeutically oriented research by endorsing embryonic stem cell
research.
III. DEBATE OVER STEM CELL RESEARCH
The principal concerns regarding stem cell research relate to
issues of respect for life, potential exploitation of women, and a fear
of abusing the technology used in this research. The most vocal
opponents to stem cell research are religious groups and anti-abortion
advocates; but there are many people who consider themselves liberal
minded or are not religiously affiliated who find the notion of stem
cell research unsettling. Americans are thus sharply divided on the
issue,25 and it seems probable that these moral considerations would
be high on Congress' list of reasons advocating federal legislation in
the area of stem cell research.
A. Respect for Life
The source for embryonic stem cells causes some people to be
put off by the thought of embryonic stem cell research. As already
noted, stem cells can come from embryonic or adult tissue.26 The
primary sources for embryonic stem cells are embryos that either
have been discarded as the by-product of abortions or were created
for in vitro fertilization, but never used.27 For some opponents of this
practice, the use of embryonic stem cells for research is inconsistent
with the values of political liberalism because it amounts to

24. Soren Holm, Going to the Roots of the Stem Cell Controversy, 16(6) BIOETHICS
493, 495 (2002). For papers advocating the potential of embryonic stem cells, see, e.g.,
Vats, supra note 20, at 230; and, Martin F. Pera, Human PluripotentStem Cells: A Progress
Report, 11(5) CURRENT OPINION IN GENETICS. & DEv. 595, 598 (2001).

For papers

advocating the potential of adult stem cells, see, e.g., Catherine M. Verafaillie et al., Stem
Cells: Hype and Reality, in HEMATOLOGY 2002 369 (Am. Soc. of Hematology 2002); and,
Christopher B. Ballas, Adult Bone Marrow Stem Cells for Cell and Gene Therapies:

Implications for Greater Use, 38 J. Cell Biochem Supp. 20 (2002).
25. See New Poll Shows Mixed Opinionson Stem Cell Research, USA Today, Pro-life
Infonet (Jul. 12, 2001) (stating statistics acquired from polling Americans in 2001 on their
positions
on
stem
cell
research),
available
at
http://web.archive.org/web/20021208031140/prolifeinfo.org/stemcel1003.html.
26. Holm, supra note 24, at 494.
27. See Am. Ass'n for the Advancement of Sci. & The Inst. For Civil Soc'y, Stem Cell
Topic:

Sources

of

Stem

Cells

and

Guidelines

for

Use,

http://www.counterbalance.net/stemcell/sourcl-body.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2003).

at
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exploitation of a weak and helpless population of human individuals.
For others, the issue is purely religious: life begins at conception, thus
any destruction of the embryo is a destruction of life.29
The religious position on embryonic stem cell research is
consistent with the pro-life advocates' view on abortion. This
consistency is not merely coincidental. That is, certain opponents of
embryonic stem cell research are concerned that conducting
experiments on embryos discarded after abortions makes those who
use the cells complicit in the abortion, and therefore complicit in the
murder of a human being." One opponent of embryonic stem cell
research has gone so far as to imply that the evil deriving from the use
of embryonic stem cells for medical experimentation is analogous to
the practice of human experimentation conducted by Nazis in World
War II Germany.
The conflict between a concern for life and the use of embryonic
stem cells for research cannot be resolved easily. It is rooted in
extremely personal and emotionally charged religious, moral, ethical,
and philosophical beliefs. The only apparent resolution to the debate
is to concede that there exists fundamental opposition to embryonic
stem cell research deriving from these beliefs, just as there exists
stalwart support for such research based on a different interpretation
of the same values.
B. Exploitation of Women
In addition to the moral and ethical concerns for the embryo and
for protecting and respecting life, there exists a fear that the practice
28. See Marc Hedrick & Scott Klusendorf, Life Takes Priority Over Research, UCLA
DAILY

BRUIN,

Sept.

24,

2001,

available

at

http://www.dailybruin.ucla.edu/db/articles.asp?Preview=True&ID=16238.
29. See United States Catholic Bishops, Cloning and Embryo Research (stating the
position of the United States Catholic Bishops who oppose stem cell research), at
http://www.usccb.org/prolife/issues/bioethic/factsheets.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2003). See
Gustav Niebuhr, Religions Ponder the Stem Cell Issue, New York Times Online (Aug. 27,
2001) (suggesting that other religious denominations have not come down on one side or
the other of the stem cell debate), available at http://www.uua.org/news/010827.html; see
also Interview by CNN with Elizabeth Cohen, CNN Medical Correspondent, Elizabeth
Cohen:
Ethics
of
Stem
Cell
Research
(Jul.
18,
2001),
at
http://www.cnn.com/2001/HEALTH/07/17/cohen.otsc/.
30. Bruce Murray, The Law and Ethics of Stem Cell Research and Cloning:
Embryonic Stem Cell Research Bumps into Anti-Abortion Argument (Apr. 2, 2001), at
http://www.facsnet.org/tools/sci tech/biotek/ethics.php3.
31. Linda K. Bevington, Stem Cell Research and "Therapeutic" Cloning: A Christian
Analysis,
The
Center
for
Bioethics
and
Human
Dignity,
at
http://www.cbhd.org/resources/stemcells/overview.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2003).
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of embryonic stem cell research will lead to exploitation and coercion
of women." The argument begins with the proposition that women
are crucial to the survival and persistence of embryonic stem cell
research because they provide the fundamental basis for such
research - the egg.33 The ensuing concern derives from the possibility
that women will feel a certain pressure to continue to provide eggs in
order to sustain the needs of scientists for these cells.34 Furthermore,
there is a fear that women are vulnerable to pressures to take part in
fertility research and that their participation in these studies might in
some cases be involuntary.35
Regardless of the impetus driving a woman's decision to donate
eggs for stem cell research, two things remain true, at least for the
foreseeable future: (1) women will continue to have abortions and
undergo in vitro fertilization; and (2) hundreds of aborted embryos
and excess eggs from in vitro fertilization will be produced each year.
Whether or not women who obtain abortions or undergo in vitro
fertilization feel pressure to do something constructive with their
embryos or eggs (e.g., donate them to research) is unclear. But, the
suggestion that women are vulnerable to pressures to aid in research
because it ultimately will be a benefit to them is paternalistic. When
presented with the option of either throwing away an embryo or an
egg or donating it, a woman should be allowed to make a decision
without any interference from either camp. But, for those women
who desire to turn over their excess embryos or eggs for use in
scientific experimentation, the option should not be foreclosed based
merely on a fear that some women are too weak or susceptible to
coercion to make an independent decision. If a woman prefers to
donate her healthy, valuable eggs to science rather than discard them,
she should have this option.
There is an argument that permitting embryonic stem cell
research will lead to an increased demand for embryos to support this
line of experimentation, which will create a market for embryos in
our country, and ultimately will contribute to and amplify the
problem of exploitation of women who seek to earn money through
embryo donation.36 It must be acknowledged that just as in the case
32. Cloning Californians?, supra note 2, at 1197.
33. Id.
34. Id.

35. Id.
36. See Reginald Shareef, Do We Want Another Breathtaking Scientific Achievement
or

More

Convenience

Killing?

(Sept.

11,

2000),
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of organ transplants where there simply are not enough organs for all
the people in need of organ replacement, there are not enough
embryonic stem cell lines to furnish the needs of scientists
participating in this research. So, a market for stem cells already
exists. In a capitalistic society such as ours, once there is a demand
(as there is for embryonic stem cells), market forces come into play to
satisfy this need in whatever way possible (in this case through
payment for embryo donation).
California's law (to be discussed in greater detail below) avoids
the problem of commodification at the demand level by prohibiting
the purchase or sale of embryonic and cadaveric fetal tissue.37 This
sort of regulation is important in order to avoid the creation of an
open market for embryos. As will be discussed below, regulation of
this sort belongs at the state level, not with the federal government.
The California law at issue here prohibits the exchange of money for
embryos by requiring the acquisition of embryos on a purely donative
basis; thus, it is not susceptible to the criticism that women will be
exploited by stem cell research by the seductive opportunity to earn
money through the sale of their embryos."
C. Fear of Abuse of Technology

Fear that one day the technology used for therapeutic stem cell
research will be abused derives from the fact that the procedure used
in this research is almost identical to that used in reproductive
cloning. Therapeutic cloning of embryonic stem cells involves
removing the DNA-containing nucleus of an ovum, replacing it with
the DNA from another human cell, allowing the stem cells to divide
and multiply, and ultimately providing the cells with certain growth
factors to induce the undifferentiated stem cells to form specialized
cells that one day might be injected into a patient. 9 The primary
difference between therapeutic cloning involving stem cells and
reproductive cloning is that the cells used for therapeutic cloning are
http://www.roanoke.com/columnists/shareef/091100.html; Interview by John King, CNN
Senior White House Correspondent, with Christopher Reeve, Christopher Reeve on
Politics
and
Stem
Cell
Research
(Jul.
30,
2001),
at
http://archives.cnn.com/2001/ALLPOLITICS/07/29/reeve.cnna/.
37. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125320 (West Supp. 2004) (replacing former
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125117 (West 2002)).

38. Id.
39.

Therapeutic Cloning: How it's Done, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN.COM (Nov. 24,

2001), available at http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?articlelD=00016CF7-CE54-1CF493F6809EC5880000.
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never implanted into a woman's womb; thus, while they seem to have
the potential to become organs, embryonic stem cells used for
therapeutic cloning never will become a human being. '
IV. CALIFORNIA'S LEGISLATIVE ACTION
On September 22, 2002, the California Legislature enacted
Senate Bill 253 pertaining to the state's position on stem cell
research.' In an historic move, Governor Gray Davis approved the
Bill, permitting the derivation and use of all types of stem cells,
including embryonic stem cells, for research purposes.42 The Bill first
outlines the potential uses to which stem cells can be put in the
biomedical field. and recognizes that ethical and policy concerns arise
in this area.43 Next, section 125300 of the California Health and
Safety Code states:
The policy of the State of California shall be as follows: (a) That
research involving the derivation and use of human embryonic
stem cells, human embryonic germ cells, and human adult stem
cells from any source.., shall be permitted .... (b) [Said
research] shall be reviewed by an approved institutional review
board. 4
In a seeming attempt to satisfy moral opponents, the Bill is
careful to include the above provision, ensuring that any research
conducted with embryonic stem cells will be monitored by a review
board to make certain that researchers are complying with the stated
guidelines.
Further, section 125315 of the California Health and Safety Code
provides instructions for medical practitioners in fertility clinics who
deal with surplus embryos. It provides:
(a) A physician and surgeon, or other health care provider
40. B.A. Robinson, Therapeutic Cloning: How it is Done; Possible Benefits, Ontario
Consultants
on
Religious
Tolerance
(Aug.
17,
2000),
at
http://www.religioustolerance.org/clo-ther.htm.
41. The following day, California enacted what essentially is an extension of prior
legislation pertaining to cloning. Senate Bill 1230 (like its predecessors mentioned in
footnote 6) reaffirms California's prohibition on human reproductive cloning and extends
the provisions indefinitely. For more detail, see infra Part IV.
42. S.B. 253, 2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002).
43. Id.
44. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125300 (West Supp. 2004) (replacing former
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125115 (West 2002)).
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delivering fertility treatment shall provide his or her patient
with timely, relevant, and appropriate information to allow the
individual to make an informed and voluntary choice regarding
the disposition of any human embryos remaining following
fertility treatment ....(b) Any individual to whom information
is provided pursuant to subdivision (a) shall be presented with
the option of storing any unused embryos, donating them to
another individual, discarding the embryos, or donating the
remaining embryos for research.45
The final clause of section 125315 specifies that any individual
who opts to donate unused embryos to research must provide written
consent before the embryos can be used by scientists. 6 Together, the
clauses of section 125315 quell critics' fears pertaining to coercion or
forced donation by women. The law requires medical practitioners to
present clear options to women who then are able to make a free
election regarding what to do with their embryos. As an additional
safeguard, women who choose to donate their embryos are required
to provide written consent. In the event that a woman orally commits
to donation, she retains the option of reneging by not signing the
consent form. In this way, the Bill attempts to ensure that consent is
voluntary and not coerced.
The final section of the Bill states, "[a] person may not
knowingly, for valuable consideration, purchase or sell embryonic or
cadaveric fetal tissue for research purposes pursuant to this
chapter. 47 Because this law prohibits the exchange of money for
transactions involving embryos, the fear that a market in embryos will
be created is allayed. Although a steady and substantial supply o
embryos is required to sustain the demand of stem cell researchers,
the embryos that are made available to researchers through
California's law from voluntary donations will satisfy this need, at
least for the time being. Significantly, the text of the present law does
not allocate particular funds for stem cell research. But, according to
the Associate Vice Provost for Research in the University of
$25
California Office of the President, state funds in the amount of
4
programs.
various
through
research
this
for
available
are
million
45. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125315 (West Supp. 2004) (replacing former
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125116 (West 2002)).
46. Id.
47. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125320 (West Supp. 2004) (replacing former
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125117 (West 2002)).
48. Laura DeFrancesco, California Endorses Stem Cell Research (Sept. 15, 2002), at
http://www.biomedcentral.com/news/20020925/05/.
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The day after California adopted its new policy on stem cell
research, California re-enacted a related bill pertaining to cloning. 9
This Bill indefinitely extends California's prohibition on human
reproductive cloning, while continuing to permit therapeutic (i.e.,
non-reproductive) cloning.'
Specifically, to distinguish between
reproductive and therapeutic cloning, Senate Bill 1230 defines
"cloning" as "the practice of creating or attempting to create a human
being by ...[nuclear transfer] ... for the purpose of, or to implant,

the resulting product to initiate a pregnancy that could result in the
birth of a human being."51 Because therapeutic cloning is not aimed
at creating a human being and no implantation occurs, it is not
prohibited under this Bill. Thus, when considered together with the
specifications for embryonic stem cell research under Senate Bill 253,
explicitly allowing only therapeutic cloning puts to rest the concern
that California's new law will generate or contribute to an abuse of
technology.
V. HISTORY OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION IN THE
AREA OF STEM CELL RESEARCH
Until the early 1990s, human embryo research faced much
executive opposition.52 During their terms, both President Reagan
and the first President Bush supported a ban on federal funding of
human embryonic research. 3 The situation changed in 1993,
however, when, during his first week in office, President Clinton
issued a memorandum lifting an almost twenty year ban on federal
funding of fetal tissue research-4 President Clinton stated that the
ioratorium on fetal tissue research "ha[d] significantly hampered the
development of possible treatments for individuals afflicted with
serious diseases and disorders," and so he immediately lifted the
ban. 5 Following President Clinton's bold move in support of
scientific progress, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) issued a
set of temporary guidelines governing the use of federal funds for
49. S.B. 1230, 2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Goldstein, supra note 14, at 237; see also Konsen, supra note 10, at 510.
53. Goldstein, supra note 14, at 237.
54. Memorandum from President Clinton to the Secretary of Heath and Human
Services (Jan. 22, 1993), available at http://www.grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/noticefiles/not93-091.html.
55. Id.
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fetal tissue for research.
Despite President Clinton's executive effort to advance scientific
research, Congress was not prepared to make a similar endorsement
of federally funded fetal tissue research 7 In 1995, through the socalled "Dickey Amendment" (named for Republican Representative
Jay Dickey), Congress placed a ban on appropriating federal funds
The amendment, which
for fetal tissue research by the NIH.
continues to appear in even the most recent NIH appropriations bills,
reads as follows:
Sec 510. (a) None of the funds made available in this Act may
be used for-(1) the creation of a human embryo or embryos
for research purposes; or (2) research in which a human embryo
or embryos are destroyed, discarded, or knowingly subjected to
risk of injury or death greater than that allowed for research on
fetuses in utero under 45 CFR 46.208(a)(2) and section 498(b)
of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 289g(b)).
(b) For purposes of this section, the term "human embryo or
embryos" includes any organism, not protected as a human
subject under 45 CFR 46 as of the date of the enactment of this
Act, that is derived by fertilization, parthenogenesis, cloning, or
any other means from one or more human gametes or human
diploid cells.5 9
The first embryonic stem cell lines, isolated in 1998, brought the
embryonic stem cell/human embryo research debate to the
forefront. 60 One year later, the Department of Heath and Human
Services (DHHS), of which the NIH is one principal branch, declared
that the Dickey Amendment ban did not prohibit embryonic stem cell6
embryos., '
research "because human pluripotent stem cells are not
56. See NIH Interim Guidelines for the Support and Conduct of Therapeutic Human
available at
1993),
22,
(Jan.
Research
Transplantation
Tissue
Fetal
http://www.grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/not93-091.html.
57. Am. Ass'n for the Advancement of Sci., AAAS Policy Brief.- Stem Cell Research
(Aug. 14, 2002), at http://www.aaas.org/spp/cstc/issues/stemcells.htm.
58. Id.
59. Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-116, 115 Stat. 2177.
60. See Press Release, Johns Hopkins Med. Inst., supra note 1.
61. Statement of Harold H. Varmus, M.D., Director, National Institutes of Health,
Before the Senate Appropriations Committee on Labor, Heath and Human Services,
at
1999),
26,
(Jan.
Agencies
Related
and
Education
http://stemcells.nih.gov/policy/statements/statement.asp. The reasoning of the DHHS was
as follows:
The statute that bans the use of Federal funds for embryo research defines
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Following this declaration, the NIH issued a new set of guidelines in
August 2000.2 A key stipulation in the NIH guidelines was that
federal funds could not be used for the derivation of embryonic stem
cells from human embryos.63 Specifically, the guidelines state that

studies conducted with federal funds are permissible only if "the cells
were derived (without Federal funds) from human embryos that were
created for the purposes of fertility treatment and were in excess of
the individuals seeking such treatment."' 6

the clinical need of

Therefore, even after the NIH established this more permissive policy

on embryonic stem cell research, the derivation of embryonic stem
cell lines still had to be accomplished through private funding.
The election of President George W. Bush troubled proponents
of embryonic stem cell research: Would the conservative Presidentelect overturn the NIH guidelines and ban all embryonic stem cell
research? 6 During his campaign, Candidate Bush stated, "I oppose
federal funding for stem cell research that involves destroying living

human embryos."
Although it took him a few months before
making a public statement regarding the current administration's
policy on stem cell research, President Bush announced his policy on
August 9, 2001.67 In his televised address to the Nation, the President
outlined the moral dilemma at the root of the stem cell controversy.6
He went on to declare, perhaps to the surprise of some Americans,
that he would support federal funding of research using the

approximately sixty existing embryonic stem cell lines.69

The

embryo as an organism derived by fertilization and other means. The statute
does not, however, define organism. Therefore, the legal opinion relied on the
broadly accepted science-based definition of organism: an individual constituted
to carry out all life functions. By this definition-and as you heard from all the
witnesses that responded to that question at your hearing on this matter on
December 2, 1999-pluripotent stem cells are not and cannot develop into
organisms. Therefore, human pluripotent stem cells are not embryos and are not
covered by this prohibition on Federal funding. In addition, the legal opinion
states that DHHS funds can be used for research using human pluripotent stem
cells that were derived from fetal tissue if the existing laws and regulations
governing fetal tissue research are obeyed.
62. National Institutes of Health Guidelines for Research Using Human Pluripotent
Stem Cells, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,976 (Aug. 25, 2000).
63. Id. at 51,979.
64. Id.
65. See Am. Ass'n for the Advancement of Sci., supra note 57.
66. Id.
67. George W. Bush, Remarks by the President on Stem Cell Research (Aug. 9,
2001), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/08/2001O809-2.html.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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President also stated that federal funds in the amount of $250 million
would be allocated to research on adult stem cells in 2001.70
Furthermore, President Bush announced that, pursuant to his new
policy, he would create a council composed of leading scholars in
various disciplines "to monitor stem cell research, to recommend
appropriate guidelines and regulations, and to consider all of the
medical and ethical ramifications of biomedical innovation. '' 71 As was
the case with the NIH guidelines of 2000, the President's decree one
year later appeared to allow private funding for the creation of new
embryonic stem cell lines and research thereon. To date, Congress
has not taken any legislative action to prohibit embryonic stem cell
research or further restrict the President's position.
VI. DOES CONGRESS HAVE THE POWER TO
REGULATE EMBRYONIC STEM CELLS?
In light of the heated debate surrounding embryonic stem cells,
the conservative nature of the current administration, Court, and the
Republican-dominated Congress, one wonders whether the federal
government will seek to regulate further in the area of embryonic
stem cell research. Will Congress seek to undo state legislation like
California's permissive law on embryonic stem cell research? In
theory, Congress could attempt to justify federal regulation of stem
cell research based on a number of its constitutionally granted
powers, including the commerce, spending, or taxing powers. But, as
demonstrated below, these traditional constitutional powers will not
suffice to validate any attempt by Congress to take the power of such
regulation out of the hands of the states.
A. Commerce Clause
1. Commerce Clause Background
Article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution grants to
Congress the power to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."" One of the
Court's earliest Commerce Clause analyses appeared in Gibbons v.
Ogden in which Chief Justice Marshall dissected the language of the

70. Id.
71. George W. Bush, Remarks by the President on Stem Cell Research (Aug. 9,
2001), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/08/20010809-2.html.
72. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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Clause to uncover the scope of Congress' commerce power.73 In this

opinion, Marshall provided what became a fundamental definition of
"commerce" as follows: "Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is
something more - it is intercourse. It describes the commercial
intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches,
and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that
intercourse. 7 4 Similarly, he developed the concepts of "among the
several states" and Congress' "power to regulate."75 In the years

following this decision, the Court repeatedly exhibited an
unwillingness to validate uses of the Commerce Clause that seemed
to interfere with state power."

In 1937, however, the Court's position with respect to the
Commerce Clause shifted.

The Court moved away from its

formalistic, rule-oriented approach to Commerce Clause questions,
and adopted a more functional, case-specific method of analysis.77
For example, in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., the Court

employed a novel balancing approach in analyzing Commerce Clause
issues in which it considered case-specific facts in making its
determinations, rather than adhering to hard and fast rules as it had

done in the past.78 This functional approach can be seen repeatedly in
Supreme Court jurisprudence between 1937 and 1995. 79
73. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
74. Id. at 189-90.
75. Id. at 194-96.
76. See, e.g., Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (holding that lottery tickets are
subject to traffic and are therefore instruments of commerce to be regulated under the
Commerce Clause); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (holding that Congress
cannot regulate the products of child labor under the Commerce Clause); Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (holding that applying federal wage
and hour laws to intrastate businesses violated Congress' power under the Commerce
Clause).
77. See Coby S.Nixon, Human Cloning and the Commerce Power: In Light of United
States v. Lopez Congress Can - But Should Not - Regulate Human Cloning, 37 GA. L.
REV. 295, 308 (2002).
78. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
79. For cases during the years 1937-1995 utilizing the functional approach to
Commerce Clause analysis, see cases such as United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941)
(holding that Congress could regulate an activity carried on intrastate if it had a
substantial effect on interstate commerce); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (using
the broad impact of aggregated individual effects on interstate commerce to sustain
regulation); and, Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981)
(holding that the commerce power is broad enough to regulate intrastate activities that
have environmental effects beyond state borders). In the context of civil rights, see cases
such as Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (holding that
hotels, motels, etc. discriminating on the basis of race have an effect on interstate
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The Court took a step backwards in 1995 by reverting to its pre1937 formalistic approach to Commerce Clause jurisprudence to
invalidate the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990.80 For the first
time in nearly sixty years, the Court invalidated a federal regulation
on the ground that Congress had exceeded its commerce power."
Under the Act, it was a federal offense "for any individual knowingly
to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has
reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone." 2
In supporting its decision to invalidate the Act, the Court
enumerated three areas in which Congress could regulate pursuant to
its power under the Commerce Clause: (1) the use of the channels of
interstate commerce, (2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce,
and (3) those activities "having a substantial relation to interstate
commerce." 3 The Court then stated that if the Gun-Free School
Zones Act could be sustained, it would have to be under the third
category, as it clearly did not fall within the first two areas."
Following this determination, the Court created a framework within
which it conducted its analysis of the Act under the third category. 5
The Court reiterated what had become a pattern in Commerce
Clause jurisprudence by stating, "[wihere economic activity
substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that
activity will be sustained."8 Looking at the Gun-Free School Zones
Act, the Court held that the Act was unrelated to any sort of
economic activity. 7 With regard to what constitutes an "economic
activity," the Court said that one of two criteria must be satisfied to
justify regulation under the commerce power: Either (1) the statute
must deal with commerce or an economic enterprise or, (2) it must be
"an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity. 8 8 As
can be seen in the Court's above statement, it is not enough that an
activity is characterized as "economic;" it must also "substantially
commerce sufficient to justify regulation); and, Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294
(1964) (validating use of the Commerce Clause to federal desegregation regulations
relating to restaurants).
80. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 551.
83. Id. at 558-59.
84. Id. at 559.
85. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-64.
86. Id. at 560.
87. Id. at 561.
88. ld.
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affect[] interstate commerce. ' 9
The second element required by the Court under its analysis was
a "jurisdictional element which would ensure, through case-by-case
inquiry, that the [offense at issue] 'affects interstate commerce.".90 In
Lopez, the Court said that no such jurisdictional nexus existed in the
Gun-Free School Zones Act because the statute lacked the necessary
element that "might limit its reach to a discrete set of firearm
possessions that additionally [had] an explicit connection with or
effect on interstate commerce." 91

Finally, the Court mentioned that congressional findings,
although not necessary, can be useful to support the proffered
relationship between the offense cited in the statute and its impact on
interstate commerce.' The evidence put forth by the Government
concerning the correlation between guns in school zones and
interstate commerce ultimately did not persuade the Court. 93

In

eventually invalidating the Gun-Free School Zones Act, the Court
found that in order to sustain the Government's arguments, it would
have to "pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair
to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a
general police power of the sort retained by the States," a step which
the Court was unwilling to take. 9'
Just five years after Lopez, the Court again invalidated an act of
Congress premised on its commerce power. 95 The statute at issue in

United States v. Morrison involved a civil remedy for victims of
gender-based violent crimes under the Violence Against Women Act
of 1994.9 As in Lopez, the Court here conducted its Commerce
Clause analysis by examining whether this Act fit within the third
category listed in Lopez; that is, whether violence against women had
a substantial effect on interstate commerce.!
The Court in Morrison found some similarities between the
Violence Against Women Act and the Gun-Free School Zones Act at

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 560.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
Id. at 562.
Id. at 562-63.
Id. at 562-65.
Id. at 567.
See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
Id. at 601-02.
Id. at 609.
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issue in Lopez. 9 As in Lopez, the Court here held that "[these
crimes] are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity." 99
Additionally, the Court held that Congress failed to provide any
jurisdictional connection between violence against women and
interstate commerce, as required to show a substantial effect on
interstate commerce.0 °
In contrast to Lopez in which the Court faced a lack of
supporting congressional findings, in Morrison the Court stated that
the Government presented a number of compelling findings to
support a connection between gender-based violence and interstate
commerce.101
The Court noted, however, that despite the
Government's showing, "the existence of congressional findings is not
sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality of Commerce
Clause legislation." 1°0 Because the prevention of violent crime falls
within the powers traditionally reserved to the State, the Court
refused to sustain this Act on the ground that the statute effectively
would allow Congress to "use the Commerce Clause to completely
obliterate the Constitution's distinction, between national and local
authority

.,,03

2. Commerce Clause Applied to Embryonic Stem Cell Regulation and its
Effect on California'sLaw

In light of the three categories listed in Lopez, it is fair to
conclude that stem cells do not fall within either category one or
category two as the cells are not channels or instrumentalities of
interstate commerce. Therefore, in order to justify federal regulation
of embryonic stem cells under the Commerce Clause, Congress would
have to demonstrate that embryonic stem cells (or embryonic stem
cell research) have a substantial impact on interstate commerce.1°4
Even under this classification, however, an attempt by Congress to
regulate embryonic stem cells on this basis of its commerce power
would be in vain.
A threshold requirement for exercising the commerce power is
stated plainly in the text of the Constitution: The power must be
98.
99.
100.,
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 613.
Id.
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613.
Id. at 614.
Id. at 614.
Id. at 615.
See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.
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"commerce." '05

wielded to regulate
Furthermore, Supreme Court
precedent has interpreted this requirement by stating that an act that
seeks to regulate an economic activity that has a substantial effect on
interstate commerce is within the scope of the commerce power.)°
Therefore, in order for the government to regulate embryonic stem
cells, it must show that these cells fall within the scope of its
regulatory power under the Commerce Clause-a showing that
cannot be made successfully.
The concepts of "commerce" and "economic activity" naturally
bring to mind goods that are engaged in or are products of
intercourse or commercial traffic. One cannot help but equate
"commerce" with the commercial exchange or sale of goods.
Likewise, if no money is exchanged in a transaction, one generally
does not consider the exchange an "economic activity" or
"commerce." Recall that the Court in Lopez stated that to be
classified as economic, an activity must be economic in nature or its
° Examples of
regulation must be part of a larger regulatory scheme.'O
practices that have been treated as economic activities in the past
include personal consumption of homegrown wheat, discriminatory
practices in restaurants and motels, and extortionate credit
transactions.08 All of these examples clearly possess an "economic"
or "commercial" nature, as each involves an activity that relates to a
larger, related market, the regulation of which is justifiable.
Embryonic stem cells themselves are not economic in nature.
Arguably, the cells constitute commerce because they are associated
with highly lucrative research positions and large sums of money are
donated or used for investment in stem cell research projects. But,
this argument does not satisfy the Lopez requirement that the activity
be economic in nature or a part of a larger regulation of an economic
activity. Embryonic stem cells are the biological byproducts of
fertilization, not common commercial items. As demonstrated in
Lopez, the current Court is reluctant to expand the meaning of
''economic activity" beyond the traditional sphere of "things
commercial" as the term "commercial" is commonly used. If the

105. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl.
3.
106. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. 1 (1937); United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100 (1941); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
107. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-64.
108. See, respectively, Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Heart of Atlanta Motel,
Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964);
and, Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
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potential fallout related to guns in school zones did not constitute a
basis for regulation of an economic activity, the Court likely would
show a similar reluctance to characterize embryonic stem cells as
"commerce" or as associated with an economic activity. Similarly,
even when presented with persuasive factual findings indicating that
violence against women affects interstate commerce, the Court was
unwilling to endorse use of the commerce power in this area. There is
no clear link between embryonic stem cells and interstate commerce.
In order to classify embryonic stem cells as economic, Congress
would be forced to "pile inference upon inference" - a practice for
which the Court already has shown its distaste."°
Therefore,
Congress should not be able to exercise its commerce power to
regulate intrastate collection and use of embryonic stem cells.
Therefore, the question is: "What aspects of embryonic stem
cells, or stem cell research more generally, cross state lines and
consequently impact interstate commerce?" One could assert that
scientists, embryo donors (cell donors), and financial donors who
support stem cell research might cross borders to enter states that are
research friendly (such as California), thus creating an effect on
interstate commerce. While each of these prospects is possible (as
evidenced by the recent movement of funds and scientists to
California), the question remains as to whether or not they create a
substantialimpact on interstate commerce.
In Lopez, the Court refused to accept the alleged connection
between guns in school zones and interstate commerce, which the
Government advanced in support of its use of the commerce power. '
The Government's first argument suggested that possession of a gun
in a school zone may result in violent crime which would have a
negative effect on the national economy because it is costly and
because people are less likely to travel to areas that they perceive to
be dangerous.1" Second, the Government asserted that the presence
of guns in school zones would have an adverse impact on the learning
environment which would lead to less productive citizens and a
disparate impact on the economic well being of the nation."2 Just as
in Lopez, where the Court concluded that the connection between
guns in school zones and interstate commerce was too tenuous to
sustain an act of federal legislation, it is a stretch to propose that
109.
110.
111.
112.

See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-66.
Id. at 563-64.
Id. at 564.
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embryonic stem cells have more than an incidental effect on interstate
commerce, if they have any perceptible impact at all.
The California law at issue here would serve as an exemplary
state regulation that would be indefatigable against congressional
attempts to regulate embryonic stem cells under the commerce
power. California's law essentially eliminated any Commerce Clause
issue by prohibiting the exchange of embryos for monetary
consideration."3 The donation of embryos and the extraction of cells
there from do not constitute economic activities. Furthermore,
because no sales of such embryos or cells can be made, there will not
be any resultant interstate transactions. Finally, whether or not
people move to California either as donors, researchers, or supporters
of the research, any such individual movement would have a
negligible effect on interstate commerce. The California law thus
appears protected from any potential future exercise of the commerce
power to regulate stem cells or invalidate state laws pertaining
thereto.
It should be noted, however, that Congress likely would be able
to regulate the movement of products of embryonic stem cell research
and the sale of embryonic stem cells or embryos pursuant to its
commerce power.
As compared to the extraction and use of
embryonic stem cells within a state for research purposes, any action
that moves the byproducts of stem cell research across state borders
creates a much greater case for congressional regulation pursuant to
the commerce power. To wit, various research groups hold patents
for procedures used in conducting this research and may license other
laboratories (including those in other states) to use their protocols for
a price."4 And, part of the argument advanced above, suggesting that
embryonic stem cells are not themselves within the scope of the
Commerce Clause, rested on the determination that the cells do not
qualify as commercial goods because no money is exchanged for
them. Any sale of embryonic stem cells or embryos would be a
commercial transaction, an economic activity. Therefore, if these
sales were interstate, the cells or embryos likely would become
subject to federal control in the event that Congress opted to exercise
its commerce power over their sale.
Despite the federal government's ability to use its commerce
power to regulate interstate movement of the products of embryonic
113. See CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125320 (West Supp. 2004) (replacing former
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125117 (West 2002)).
114. Nixon, supra note 77, at 314.
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stem cell research or the sale of embryonic stem cells and embryos,
Congress should leave such regulating to the States. Generally,
embryonic stem cell research involves various areas that traditionally
have been under local (not federal) control. For instance, if Congress
sought to regulate or ban these elements of embryonic stem cell
research, it might run the risk of impinging on a state's general right
to regulate health care, local crime, or local moral standards, which
are not enumerated areas of federal control.115 Thus, Congressional
use of the commerce power to regulate embryonic stem cell research
products or the sale of the cells and embryos would risk
"obliterat[ing] the Constitution's distinction between national and
local authority" and should provide a logical deterrent to such
regulation.116
B. The Taxing and Spending Powers
Congress' power to spend and tax comes from Article I, Section
8 which recites the power as follows: "The Congress shall have Power
To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the
Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of
the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be
uniform throughout the United States., 1 7 The spending and taxing
powers are potent regulatory devices Congress can use to place a
given area under federal control, especially when it appears that
Congress cannot exert such control under its commerce power. '
1. HistoricalUses and Tests for the Taxing and Spending Powers
Generally speaking, federal taxation acts are presumed valid. 19
Such acts are permissible even when their primary motive is to obtain
revenue, although they have the "incidental motive" of discouraging
particular practices by "making their continuance onerous."' 20 But,
when the penalizing feature of a tax exceeds the revenue-generating
feature, such an act cannot be sustained under the taxing power. 121
115. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1992); Lori B. Andrews, Is There a Right to
Clone? Constitutional Challenges to Bans on Human Cloning, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
643, 669 (1998); Nixon, supra note 77, at 318-20.
116. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615.
117. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
118. See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis,
301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987).
119. See Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 37-38 (1922).
120. Id. at 38.
121. Id.
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For instance, an excise tax of 10% placed on the net profits of each
employer of child labor was deemed a penalty and was struck down
on the ground that it aimed at eradicating the use of child labor and,
therefore, could not be classified as an appropriate act of taxation. 22
Both the taxing and spending powers require that any funds
collected or used pursuant to this clause be applied not only for the
payment of debts and the provision of a common defense, but also for
the "general Welfare of the United States. ..."'23 In the context of
the spending power, certain limitations are imposed in addition to the
general welfare requirement of the constitutional text. 24
The
applicable additional limitations for this discussion include the
requirement that states be aware of the consequences of conditional
funding and that the condition imposed by the federal government be
related to the expenditure." Furthermore, the Court stated that, "in
some circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress [to
induce state compliance with a spending measure] might be so
coercive as to
pass the point at which 'pressure turns into
26
compulsion."1
Pursuant to the spending power, the Court validated a federal
law directing the Secretary of Transportation to withhold 5% of
federal highway funds to states permitting the purchase or possession
of alcohol by persons under 21 years of age. 127 Here, the Court
determined that the 5% cut in federal funding was not a coercive
measure, and was consistent with the government's goal of increasing
highway safety. 1"
2. The Taxing and Spending Powers as Applied to Embryonic Stem Cells
If Congress wanted to exercise its taxing power to regulate
embryonic stem cells or stem cell research for the purpose of
essentially abolishing permissive state laws, one approach would be to
impose heavy taxes on all aspects of the research. Congress could
begin by taxing the facilities that provide women with the choice to
donate their embryos to research. It could continue by taxing the use
of embryonic stem cells in research, and complete the cycle by taxing
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 37.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987).
Id.
Id. at 211, (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).
See Dole, 483 U.S. at 212.
See Dole, 483 U.S. at 211.
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any byproduct of embryonic stem cell research. Each of these moves
could, in theory, be justified based on a desire to promote high
standards of public health, appropriate guidelines for safe scientific
research, or proper monitoring of biotechnological advances, which
would all fall under the broad category of "general welfare."
It is likely, however, that this kind of heavy taxation of stem cell
research would raise suspicion regarding Congress' motive in
implementing these tax schemes. Such measures would effectively
tax the promising industry of embryonic stem cell research to death,
rendering it an area that few, if any, scientists would pursue. It seems
clear that such measures amount to a penalty for participating in
embryonic stem cell research, rather than a permissible exercise of
the taxing power. The goal of these measures would be to eliminate
the moral issue created by embryonic stem cell research by wiping out
the industry altogether. However, this sort of exercise of the taxing
power cannot be supported under the Constitution or Supreme Court
precedent because, as Leo Martinez noted, "when taxes become
prohibitive, and take on moral overtones ...the Court will not allow
such taxes to be imposed."' 29
If Congress' power to tax embryonic stem cells could not be
upheld, Congress conceivably could attempt to regulate embryonic
stem cell research under its spending power. As such, one likely
move would be to condition Medicare or other health benefits
provided by the federal government on a state promise to prohibit
embryonic stem cell research. Considering the limitations on the
spending power enumerated in South Dakota v. Dole, as long as a
state had full knowledge of the consequences of participation or nonparticipation in the federal spending plan, a case could be made that
the condition imposed bore a relation to the expenditure at issue.
That is, the government could assert that embryonic stem cell
research, from the donation of embryos to the point at which any
therapeutic use could be made of the products of the research, is a
medical concern that will affect health care and have a consequential
impact on federal budgetary matters.
The real problem with this scheme is that it provides states with
an elusive "choice" - ban embryonic stem cell research or attempt to
operate medical facilities without federal Medicare funding. States
rely heavily on federal Medicare and other health benefits. Without
this federal support, public hospitals and medical centers would cease
129. Leo P. Martinez, Taxes, Morals, and Legitimacy, 1994 BYU L. REV. 521, 564
(1994) (referring to Dep't of Revenue of Mt. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 779 (1994)).
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to exist and, likely, many private medical institutions would be forced
to close their doors as well, creating a public health crisis of epic
proportions. Obviously, when presented with this "choice," states
would have no alternative but to forego embryonic stem cell research
in order to save medical care facilities. A measure such as this
hypothetical one would present the exact sort of coercion mentioned
in Steward Machine in which efforts to induce state compliance pass
the point of mere pressure and become Compulsion. 3 ° Furthermore,
it would create an interference with a state's autonomy to make
policy decisions representative of the interests of its citizens. Such an
action would amount to the type of "commandeering" Justice
O'Connor so stridently opposed in New York v. United States because
it would impermissibly interfere with the "Constitution's division of
authority between federal and state governments."'' . Thus, any
conditional attachment like the one supposed herein would be an
impermissible basis for congressional exercise of its spending power
to regulate embryonic stem cell research.
C. Due Process: An Additional Defense:to Federal Attempts to
Regulate Embryonic Stem Cells and Stem Cell Research

The language of the Due Process Clause, which guarantees that
no person will be "deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law," obviates the need to first identify the interest at issue
when undertaking due process analysis.12 For purposes of this
examination, only the issue of whether or not a liberty interest exists
in embryonic stem cells will be considered, (although there is an
argument to be made respecting a property interest as well).
Precedent teaches that if a liberty interest is "fundamental,"
strict judicial scrutiny is the applicable standard of review, whereas a
"non-fundamental" interest must only survive "rational basis"
scrutiny. 3 '
In determining whether a particular interest is
"fundamental," the Court often looks to the traditions of the United
States to see which interests have been recognized as "fundamental"

130. See Steward Mach. Co., 301 U.S. at 590.
131. 505 U.S. 144, 175 (1992).
132. See U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV.
133. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494 (1977); Washington v. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
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throughout history.3 One example of an interest that the Court
repeatedly recognizes as fundamental is that of personal autonomy.135
Although the specific slant on the issue changes over time, the Court
stands firm in its protection of the right to personal autonomy against
government intrusion.
In theory, the federal government could attempt to ban
embryonic stem cell research by prohibiting embryo donation for use
in such research. If the government opted for this course of action,
however, a due process argument could be used to counter Congress'
assertion of power. Specifically, one would assert that decisions
pertaining to embryonic stem cells are fundamental interests because
they implicate a woman's right to make a personal decision, a right of
personal autonomy similar to the right as recognized in cases such as
Roe, Loving, and Griswold. Any decisions pertaining to embryo
donation thus would be protected from federal interference unless
the government could show a compelling interest in regulation. But,
the possible federal interests mentioned above (i.e., public health,
appropriate guidelines for safe scientific research, and proper
monitoring of biotechnological advances) would not meet the
government's burden of showing a compelling interest.
One potential criticism that could result from characterizing
decisions pertaining to embryonic stem cells as fundamental is that
there is no history or tradition in our nation to support this
classification. One could argue that, because of the dynamic nature
of biological sciences and biotechnology, a hard and fast adherence
only to traditionally recognized interests, interests that were
identifiable long before the organization of our nation (e.g., marriage,
Instead,
childbearing, family life), would be short-sighted.
personal
involving
rights
fundamental
recognized
traditionally
autonomy should be extended to accommodate new, but related
interests that result from scientific progress. John A. Robertson
echoed this point in his analysis of personal autonomy as it pertains to
posthumous reproduction.'36 He noted that "the paradigm of
personal autonomy must be refined and modulated if it is to deal

134. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491
U.S. 110 (1989); Washington v. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
135. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l,
431 U.S. 678 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967).
136. John A. Robertson, Posthumous Reproduction, 69 IND. L.J. 1027, 1028 (1994).
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effectively with new biomedical technologies."137
With this
enlightened approach, one can see that a woman's decision to donate,
discard, or save her excess embryos is protected from government
intrusion under the Due Process Clause.
Alternatively, Congress could attempt to regulate embryonic
stem cell research or the products thereof by controlling or
prohibiting the research, thus precluding the possibility of creating
any therapeutic products. In this instance, the research techniques
and methods and the byproducts of the research would be considered
"non-fundamental" interests. As already noted, where a nonfundamental interest is concerned, the applicable level of scrutiny is
"rational basis," a much less rigorous standard for the government to
meet. Although it appears that under this lesser standard of scrutiny,
an act of Congress to proscribe embryonic stem cell research might be
within Congress' authority, one must remember that such an exercise
of congressional power still requires a constitutional basis. As can be
seen from the analysis in the preceding sections, however, no such
justification can be found in the Constitution.

VII. CONCLUSION: HOW WILL CALIFORNIA'S LAW
FARE?
Does Congress have the power to regulate embryonic stem cells
or proscribe any research on such cells? The above analysis suggests
that Congress has no such authority under its commerce, taxing, or
spending power. Furthermore, any attempt by Congress to regulate
in this area would implicate principles of federalism and due process,
thus creating additional obstacles to federal regulation. In light of the
issues raised herein, it seems fair to assert that if Congress wants to
attack the area of embryonic stem cell research, it will face an uphill
and, ultimately, losing battle.
The issue of embryonic stem cell research raises a myriad of
problems - moral, ethical, and political. California's recent law cuts
through all of these dilemmas by presenting a policy that is not only
logically sound from the standpoint of scientific and medical progress,
but one that carefully and cogently addresses and accounts for each
concern related to embryonic stem cell research. The law avoids any
possibility of coerced or involuntary participation. It expressly
prohibits the exchange of embryos for monetary consideration to
avoid the creation of an "embryo market;" and, it accomplishes these
137. Robertson, supra note 136, at 1028.
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goals while promoting valuable experimentation in an area that
promises significant potential for therapeutic innovation.
This paper does not advocate totally unregulated embryonic
stem cell research. Such research holds the potential for abuse if not
This does not mean, however, that
responsibly undertaken.
embryonic stem cell research should be prohibited subject to the
whims of conservative opponents in Congress. California has taken
the proper step by endorsing embryonic stem cell research, while
maintaining guidelines to oversee it, and other states should be
advised to follow California's lead by enacting legislation that
promotes this valuable area of research, while ensuring that points of
ethical concern are addressed.
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